Abstract. We still lack any consensus about what one is actually talking about as one uses quantum mechanics. There is a gap between the abstract terms in which the theory is couched and the phenomena the theory enables each of us to account for so well. Because it has no practical consequences for how we each use quantum mechanics to deal with physical problems, this cognitive dissonance has managed to coexist with the quantum theory from the very beginning. The absence of conceptual clarity for almost a century suggests that the problem might lie in some implicit misconceptions about the nature of scientific explanation that are deeply held by virtually all physicists, but are rarely explicitly acknowledged.
3 In the case of "Wigner's friend" orthodoxy does notice the difference, but takes it to be paradoxical, rather than fundamental.
4 Distinguishing dreams and hallucinations from externally induced experiences is a subtle problem (as it can be in ordinary life) but it is the kind of refinement it would be distracting to address here. If I can persuade you that this might be a problem worth further thought, then I will have succeeded in my aim for this essay.
5 More on this in point 2.2 immediately below.
I have used myself as one example of a perceiving subject. I could equally well have written "you" or "Alice" or "Bob". I focus on one particular subject, both to underline the unbreakable privacy of the directly perceived experience of each and every one of us, and also to emphasize that each of us has their own personal model of the world, based on their own private body of experience.
What QBism adds to orthodox empiricism, as well as to orthodox interpretations of quantum mechanics, is its insistence that at the most fundamental level "experience" does not mean a unique body of common human experience. Every experience, as I use the term here, is private to the person having that experience. So is the picture of the world that each of us constructs from our own experience.
There is indeed a common external world in addition to the many distinct individual personal external worlds. But that common world must be understood at the foundational level to be a mutual construction that all of us have put together from our distinct private experiences, using our most powerful human invention: language.
Language
Personal experience is private: I cannot enter your mind and share your own experience exactly as you perceive it. It is uniquely and impenetrably yours and only yours. But language enables each of us to communicate to others crude or even quite sophisticated symbolic representations of our own experience. By language I mean not only spoken language, but books, scientific publications, emails, gestures, touches, hugs, and so on.
Because you are part of my external world, like anything else in my world you too can engender experiences in me. "Language" is any way you have to induce experiences in me, through which you can try to give me some sense of the content of experiences of your own. My experience of you provides me with highly plausible evidence that you do indeed have experiences of your own, which play for you the same role that my experience plays for me. And what you say to me can give me a sense of how you perceive particular experiences of your own.
My conclusion that you have experiences that are as direct and important for you as mine are for me, is as strong an inference as any I know. Although it is neither a demonstrable proposition nor a tautology, I would assign it a probability of 1. 6 I could not function as a social being were I not certain of this. I can't believe that you could either. More on probability 1 in point 5 below. 7 If you are already thinking about rejecting all this as solipsism, in spite of my explicit Language enables us each to hypothesize features that are common to our otherwise private personal experiences. This is how we can each arrive at something like a common understanding of major parts of the worlds that each of us has built from their own experience. We are in the habit of calling "the world" this common understanding we all arrive at through language. Each of us is also all in the potentially more dangerous habit of identifying this less vivid common world with our own private world. Until people started trying to make sense of quantum mechanics, this was a useful and usually 8 harmless practice.
Our 90-year inability to reach agreement on the fundamental meaning of quantum mechanics ought to have brought home to us the dangers of each of us identifying our own personal world with the common world we all negotiate with each other. Quantum mechanics is a tool that I use to help me make sense of my personal world. It is only because language enables us all to conclude that the worlds of different people have features in common, that quantum mechanics can also be a tool that we can use to help us make sense of our world. reference to "you" and your own experience, please jump ahead immediately to remarks 3.1.2 and 3.3.3. But then please jump back to here. 8 But see Section V. 9 "We" here can mean the scientific community as a whole, as well as I and a few collaborators.
Orthodox measurements are actions mediated by an appropriate apparatus. The outcome of a measurement in orthodox quantum mechanics is an objective property of the world: the reading of a pointer, a print-out, a tape, or a computer screen.
In QBism the role of measurement is played for me by any action whatever that I take on the world, whether or not with the help of a "measurement apparatus". The outcome of my action is the experience that the world induces back in me, in response to my action.
My experience of a pointer reading, print-out, return email, etc., are all particular examples of this much more general outcome of a much more general action. The outcome of an action, being an experience, is subjective. It is private to the person taking that action.
But its representation in language can be communicated to other people. What I call the objective world is built out of such linguistically shared subjective experiences.
The term "measurement" plays no fundamental role in QBism. The measurements that play so central a role in the orthodox theory are just particular examples of actions taken by a user of science, usually with the help of a large piece of apparatus. In QBism the outcome of a measurement or the outcome of any other action by a user, is not a "classical" fact as it is in the orthodox theory, but a private experience of that user. If you are watching me you will have your own private experiences in response to your own action, which is in this case your own observation of my action.
Language is the only means we have for trying to compare the personal outcomes of all such users, and for trying to convey all those outcomes to users who were not watching or otherwise experiencing those actions and their consequences.
Bettability
On the basis of my prior experiences I can form expectations for the responses of the world to my actions. Those expectations can be quantified into probabilities. Those probabilities can be expressed as the odds at which I am willing to place or accept bets.
Those bets should be coherent: I should never be willing to offer and take a group of bets at odds which together result in a certain loss.
10 This requirement alone can be shown to imply that my probability assignments must satisfy the usual laws of probability.
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Laws of science are the regularities we have discerned in our individual experiences, and agreed on as a result of our communications with each other. Science, in general, 10 Not merely "in the long run" but in each individual instance. 11 See, for example, C. A. Fuchs and R. Schack, "Quantum Bayesian Coherence," Reviews of Modern Physics 85, 1693-1715 (2013). and quantum mechanics, in particular, impose further constraints on my probabilistic expectations. They help each of us place better bets on our subsequent experience, based on our earlier experience. We are able to navigate the world better because it is bettable. This is obvious for the laws of quantum mechanics, which are explicitly probabilistic. It also holds for classical physics, though bettability can be obscured in classical physics by a widespread misunderstanding of probabilities that are often very close to zero or one.
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Science can be viewed as a user's guide to the world. Scientific laws are guides to action, which have proved to be spectacularly successful. This is an important fact about the world, and about each of our individual worlds. The laws of science find their meaning in the actions they inspire in every user of science.
If probabilities are personal expressions of one's willingness to bet, and one of the laws of quantum mechanics determines probabilities from quantum states, then quantum states must also be judgments of the person making the state assignment. Although they describe what one can expect from the world, quantum states are no more objective features of the world than are the probabilities that they encode.
In the orthodox interpretation when a measurement has an outcome the state of the system is said to "collapse" to a new state that incorporates that outcome. In QBism an outcome is the experience induced in an actor by the world's response to an action. The collapse of the state is nothing more than the normal updating of the expectations of that actor on the basis of new experience. The collapse of a quantum state is conceptually no different from the updating of a probability distribution on the basis of new data.
I have been chided that quantum states were collapsing in the early universe, before there were physicists. This makes no more sense than maintaining that probability distributions were updating in the early universe, before there were statisticians. What does make sense is for me to reassign a probability to certain events having happened long ago, on the basis of my new current experiences. It is the same for the collapse of quantum states used to describe phenomena in the early universe.
Probability One.
With the advent of quantum mechanics, deterministic mechanisms disappeared from physics. Should this be qualified in a footnote: "Except when quantum mechanics assigns probability 1 to an outcome"? QBism holds that probability assignments are personal 12 See point 2.5 below.
judgments even when p = 1. An expectation is assigned probability 1 if it is held as strongly as possible. Probability 1 indicates a particular intensity of belief: supreme confidence -"I'd bet my life on it." It does not imply the existence of a deterministic mechanism guaranteeing the p = 1 outcome.
An example to keep in mind is my above-mentioned assignment of probability 1 to my belief that you have personal experiences of your own that have for you the same immediate character that my experiences have for me. This is not a law of nature, backed up by objective properties of the world. It is my own fundamental guide to action. This point was made over 250 years ago by David Hume in his critique of induction.
Induction maintains that if something happens over and over and over again, we can take its occurrence to be an objective law of nature. What basis do we have for believing in induction? Only that it has worked over and over and over again. You can't establish induction without assuming its validity. Hume concludes that inductive inference is a fundamental human habit.
That probability-1 (or probability 0) assignments are personal judgments, like any other probability assignments, is essential to the coherence of QBism. This view of probability 1 or 0 has the virtue of undermining the temptation to find any kind of "nonlocality" in quantum mechanics. When a single photon is observed at one slit, nothing changes at the other slit when the probability of observing it there instantly drops to 0. The instantaneous change is in the expectations of whoever made the observation.
Most physicists take it for granted that an outcome with probability 1 must be enforced by an objective mechanism. This was succinctly put by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen. Probability-1 judgments, they held, were backed up by "elements of physical reality". Bohr wrote that the mistake of EPR lay in an "essential ambiguity" in their phrase "without in any way disturbing". For a QBist, their mistake is much simpler: probability-1 assignments, like more general probability-p assignments, are personal expressions of a willingness to place or accept bets, constrained only by the requirement that they should not lead to certain loss in any single event. When I assign probability 1, I only mean that I'd bet my life on it.
2.6. Object and Subject.
Physicists' nearly universal conviction, that science should be formulated in a way that makes no reference whatever to the personal experience of the individual user of science, makes it impossible to express any of the above. It underlies almost a century of confusion about the meaning of quantum mechanics. The fact is that my science has a subject (me) as well as an object (my world). Your science has a subject (you) as well as an object (your world). Alice's science has a subject (she) as well as an object (her world). I make the same point three times to underline both the plurality of subjects, and the plurality of worlds that each of us constructs on the basis of our own individual experience.
While each of us constructs a different world, the world of science is our joint construction of the vast body of phenomena that we try to infer, through language, to be common to our own individual worlds. Science arises out of our use of language to indicate to each other our individual experiences out of which we each construct our own individual worlds.
III. The ingredients of QBism, in more detail. solipsistic. This is wrong. I would be foolish not to acknowledge that my experience of you has provided me with overwhelming, if indirect, evidence that leads me to my unshakeable hypothesis that you have your own private experience that you perceive pretty much as I perceive mine. From your experience you infer your own world, which you tell me has for you many of the features that mine has for me. It is not solipsism if there are many distinct "solipsists" comparing notes and trying to construct a common understanding of features they believe to be shared by their own personal worlds. See also comment 3.3.3 below.
3.1.3. Direct access to one's own private experience is necessary, but not sufficient for one to be able to use quantum mechanics. One must also understand the quantum mechanical formalism well enough to be able to deduce revisions of one's expectations for one's future experience on the basis of one's prior experience. The answer to one of Einstein's many wonderful skeptical questions is "No, a mouse cannot collapse a wavepacket", because no mouse is able to learn and use the quantum formalism to update its expectations. On the other hand a machine also cannot collapse a wave-packet, because although a machine, unlike a mouse, can be programmed to use the quantum formalism, I see no evidence that a machine has any directly perceived personal experience analogous to mine. Therefore the actions on the world of a machine have no outcomes for that machine.
3.1.4. QBism takes more seriously than do most physicists the basic notion of empiricism, that all knowledge derives from experience. For a QBist empiricism has a strongly personal flavor to it: the knowledge of each one of us derives from our own personal experience. This is close to what William James called "radical empiricism". Different people with different experiences will in general have different knowledge. The answer to the skeptical question "whose knowledge?" is "the knowledge of whoever is using quantum mechanics." The answer to "knowledge about what?" is "knowledge about the experience of that knower". Collective or joint knowledge is a higher level concept, brought about by efforts to share individual knowledge through the imperfect medium of language.
3.1.5 Indeed, "knowledge" is not the appropriate term for QBist empiricism, in that it suggests something in one-to-one correspondence with impersonal features of the world. A better term is "belief". "Belief" characterizes a model of the world that particular people construct from their own particular experience. "Belief" brings into the story a believer.
"Knowledge", insofar as it suggests something more than a personal inference, does not automatically raise the question of the identity of the knower.
3.1.6 What is most important about scientific belief is that it is constantly subject to challenge and revision (updating) on the basis of new experience, including what we have learned from others about their own beliefs, based on their own experiences. As I put it elsewhere:
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What makes the pursuit of science so engrossing is to learn that one's most strongly held beliefs can be completely wrong. The search to identify and correct the old errors can lead to deep insights into nature.
The world would be a far better place for all of us if this joy scientists find in exposing their own misconceptions were more common in other areas of human endeavor.
3.1.7. There is a little remarked upon but important ambiguity in the first person plural. When Heisenberg says that quantum states are about our knowledge, "our" can mean all of us collectively or it can mean each of us individually. Failing to recognize the distinction between these two quite different meanings is responsible for much of the confusion surrounding the "Copenhagen interpretation". When a QBist says "Quantum states encapsulate our belief," the "our" always means each of us individually. To avoid ambiguity it is better to say "My (your, Alice's) quantum state assignments encapsulate my (your, her) belief" to avoid misreadings based on an implicit assumptions of a unique state assignment or of common knowledge. QBism replaces the orthodox term "knowledge" with "belief", to sharpen the distinction between individual belief based on personal experience, and shared knowledge, common to many people ranging from a few friends through the hundreds of authors of a high-energy physics paper to all of scientifically literate humanity, That common residue is generally called simply "science".
3.1.9. Lurking in most orthodox interpretations of quantum mechanics is a notion of a "classical" level of reality. Landau and Lifshitz 14 are painfully explicit about this.
Sometimes "classical" is replaced by "macroscopic" or "irreversible". From a QBist point of view all of these objective, impersonal, vaguely delineated formulations are nothing more than efforts to avoid having to invoke the bedrock of subjective, individually personal experience.
Comments on Language
14 See Section 4.8 below.
3.2.1. Niels Bohr always emphasized the importance of "ordinary language" because, he said, it was the only way to represent to others the outcomes of experiments. Bohr took such outcomes to be objective phenomena in a common external world, and this unambiguous reality of experimental outcomes has been taken for granted in all subsequent interpretations of quantum mechanics. 15 In QBism, however, outcomes are not limited to "experiments" and they are neither objective nor commonly held. An outcome is the personal experience induced in a user by the world's response to his or her personal action.
As such it is private and subjective.
3.2.2. For a QBist, language -ordinary or technical -is even more essential than it was for Bohr. Language is the only way one can try to represent to others one's private personal experience, or get from others a sense of their own private experience. Science concerns that which is common to the worlds each of us infers from our own unique experience. Language is essential to an understanding of our common science because it is the only way we have to get a sense of what is common to our different private experiences.
3.2.3
Since science is what we can distill out of our individual personal experiences through our efforts to represent those experiences in language, science itself is a form of language -a very powerful one. In one sense this seems obvious: we learn science from books and teachers. Both represent the relevant experiences to us verbally. In another sense it seems obviously wrong: the laws of physical science can be cast in mathematical forms having a reality that transcends the mere creatures that discover them. But mathematics itself is a form of language, even more highly refined than science.
16 Mathematical Platonists will recoil from this in horror. The rest of us, however, might think about Wigner's surprise at the "unreasonable effectiveness" of mathematics in science.
Why shouldn't mathematics, the most highly refined form of language, serve as the natural vehicle for expressing the most fundamental forms of science, another only slightly less refined form of language. Both mathematics and science are human creations. Even if you are convinced that I should not have said "creations", but "discoveries", I hope that you will still be willing to consider that what we are comparing here are two representations of those discoveries or creations in human language.
3.2.4 Without intelligent beings there cannot be language. Though many mathemati- 15 The only exception I know of is the many-worlds interpretation, in which all outcomes take place in branches of a ramifying universe. QBism regards this as the reductio ad absurdum of reifying the quantum state.
16 Bohr thought so. See 4.2.5.
cians might disagree, it makes no sense to insist that the integers would obey the unique factorization theorem even if there were no intelligent beings to define the integers and formulate the theorem. 
Comments on Bettability
3.4.1 "QBism" originally stood for "quantum Bayesianism", because it started off by taking seriously the "personalist Bayesian" view that probabilities are subjective personal judgments, and exploring the consequences of this understanding of probability for our understanding of quantum mechanics.
3.4.2. But "Bayesian" does not capture the view of probability as a personal judgment.
Some Bayesians take a firmly objective view of probability.
3.4.3. Nor is it necessary to become acquainted with technical issues in the foundations of probability theory to acquire a sense of what QBism is about, as I hope my remarks above have already made clear.
Most importantly, I would say that developing an interpretation of quantum
mechanics as an outgrowth of a subjective view of probability puts the cart before the horse. While taking a subjective view of probability does lead unavoidably to the QBist interpretation of quantum mechanics, it is the success of QBism in clarifying the interpretation of quantum mechanics that is by far the strongest argument I know of for taking seriously the view that probabilities -and even "laws of nature" 17 -are ultimately best understood as personal judgments and not objective facts.
3.4.5. The term "QBism" nevertheless remains apt, in that it describes a break with 19th century views of science that is just as great as the break of cubism with 19th century views of art. Fuchs has pointed out that there already exists an ungainly but entirely appropriate term beginning with B, bettabilitarianism coined by Oliver Wendell Holmes to describe the analog in epistemology of utilitarianism in ethics:
18 I must not say necessary about the universe. . . . We don't know whether anything is necessary or not. I believe that we can bet on the behavior of the universe in its contact with us. So I describe myself as a bettabilitarian.
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Fuchs has suggested that Holmes' little-known century-old neologism can accurately serve for the B in "QBism", and I agree. On the other hand "QBism" is acquiring a currency that permits it to stand on its own, without the B signifying anything at all.
3.4.6. To insist that quantum states existed in the early universe, long before anybody existed to assign such states, is to misunderstand the scientific description of the past.
The models of the early universe to which we assign quantum states are models that we construct to account for current experience. Without current or future data to account for we would have no basis for constructing models of the past. 3.5. Comments on Probability One.
3.5.1. This may be the hardest aspect of QBism for people to accept. If quantum states are subjective judgments, it is absurd to add the proviso that the probability-1 consequences of quantum states are exempt from this status.
3.5.2. Worse than absurd, it is inconsistent. Pure states can be defined by specifying a single action having a particular outcome to which quantum mechanics assigns a probability 1. If that outcome is backed up by an objective "element of physical reality" 21 , then that element of reality is a physical mechanism that underlies the state assignment, and the foundations of quantum mechanics plunge back into their 90-year-old fog.
3.5.3. I once remarked to Rüdiger Schack that I would never bet my life on anything.
He pointed out that I do it every time I cross a street. We build our lives around beliefs we hold with absolute certainty. Quantum mechanics should teach us to beware of reifying such powerful personal convictions into preexisting elements of reality. 3.6. Comments on Object and Subject.
3.6.1. Conventional interpretations of quantum mechanics talk a lot about object vs. subject. But the term "subject" is almost always restricted to the "observer" or the maker of the measurement. Attempts are implicitly made to objectivize the subject. The references to the "classical world", or to classical phenomena, or to the measurement apparatus, or to "macroscopic" or "irreversible" phenomena, are all manifestations of the prevailing reluctance to avoid the subjective -indeed, the personally subjective -aspect of the scientific process.
3.6.2. Critics of QBism sometimes take it to eliminate the object entirely, in favor of the subject. This is a cartoon of a response to the emphasis of QBism that science cannot be understood without reference to the subject. To be sure, each of us constructs our own objective world on the basis of our own personal experience. But we then negotiate among ourselves a common objective world that we can individually and then collectively update and revise on the basis of further individual or verbally shared experience. In 2014, at a conference celebrating the 50th anniversary of Bell's theorem, I learned that these three quotations, which I had come upon among nearly 2,000 pages of Rudolf Peierls' selected correspondence, were unfamiliar even to those who, like me, had read and admired almost everything the highly quotable John Bell had written about quantum foundations.
Quotation 4.1.1 suggests a QBist riddle: Why is quantum mechanics like a bicycle? 
Niels Bohr
4.2.1 In our description of nature the purpose is not to disclose the real essence of the phenomena but only to track down, so far as it is possible, relations between the manifold aspects of our experience. 27 "Discussion with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics" objects, occurring apart from and independently of any observer.
The quantum mechanics text of Landau and Lifshitz provides the most extreme and explicit example of the broad reluctance of physicists to allow any trace of a human presence to play a role in our understanding of quantum mechanics. 40 While other versions of quantum orthodoxy locate measurement outcomes in a vaguely defined "classical" world coupled to a quantum mechanical system, 41 Landau and Lifshitz are the only ones explicitly to insist that classical mechanics is therefore logically prior to quantum mechanics. They literally distinguish between "classical objects" and "quantum objects".
QBism makes no such distinction. The term "classical" plays no fundamental role at all in QBism. In orthodox interpretations the term "classical" enables one to avoid any reference to the directly perceived personal experience of each individual user of quantum mechanics. From the QBist perspective, calling such personal experience "classical" is part of the unacknowledged need to depersonalize what is specific to each user of quantum mechanics, and to objectify what is inherently subjective.
For a QBist there are no "classical objects" as opposed to "quantum objects". The roles of classical objects are played by the personal experiences on which an understanding of the world external to the QBist rests. The roles of quantum objects are played by the entities that the QBist hypothesizes to comprise that world on the basis of that experience.
So the QBist reformulation of quotation 4.8.1 from Landau and Lifhistz would be this:
It is impossible to formulate the basic concepts of quantum mechanics without referring to the personal experience of each user. And the second sentence of quotation 4.8.2 would become this: By measurement, in quantum mechanics, we understand any interaction between a user of quantum mechanics and the world external to that user that results in the world inducing an experience back in that user.
40 It was suggested to me by Czech colleagues that such quotations are nothing more than Landau and Lifshitz paying lip service to the Marxist doctrine of dialectical materialism. I'm unconvinced. Neither author was ever a model of orthodox Soviet behavior, and nowhere else in their voluminous writings am I aware of any other tipping of the hat to communist ideology. I doubt they would have used so strong a formulation in their exposition of basic quantum mechanics if they didn't believe it.
41 Other common and equally imprecise euphemisms for individual experience are "macroscopic" or "irreversible". 
In QBist terminology:
Objective reality is maintained in quantum mechanics through the denial of any possibility for a user to influence the particular experience induced by the reaction of the world, once the user's particular action on the world has been chosen. In specifying the nature and the likelihood of the possible experiences induced by a given action, quantum mechanics makes no reference to the particular qualities of an individual user other than that user's choice of state assignment.
The only clash here with QBism -and it is a big one -is Pauli's narrowing of the action of the user into "the experimental arrangement", and his broadening of the particularity of the user into an unspecified "observer". To be sure, QBism agrees with Pauli that the particular qualities of the user are not a part of the theory, but the fact that each user is particular, plays no role for Pauli, though it lies at the heart of QBism. according to Bohr, quantum mechanics does or does not apply.
In quotation 4.14.1 Steven Weinberg shares my concern that the lack of agreement about the meaning of quantum mechanics is a warning that ought to be taken seriously.
QBists would say that the root of the confusion that worries him lies precisely in his next two quotations, 4.14.2 and 4.14.3, which express the very common 53 insistence that laws of nature should make no reference whatever to the people who have formulated those laws.
But why should scientific laws never, under any circumstances, mention any user of science? Science is a human activity. The laws are formulated in human language. As empiricists most scientists believe that their understanding of the world is based on their own personal experience. 54 Why insist that an understanding of science, which I use to make sense of the world I infer from my experience, should make no mention whatever about the role of that experience?
If one is allowed to let users of science into the story, then there is no problem at all in locating Bohr's boundary in Weinberg's 4.14.4. The boundary -John Bell's "shifty split" 55 -is different for each scientist using quantum mechanics. But for each user the boundary is entirely unambiguous: I apply quantum mechanics to the world I construct from my own experience; the role of Bohr's classical world is played for me by that experience itself. This is quite a modest incorporation of the relation between humans and nature into nature's fundamental laws (Weinberg, 4.14.3), The laws continue to have a universal form, independent of who is using them. It's just that the domain of application of the lawsthe relation between nature and the experience of each particular person applying the laws -unavoidably varies from one user to another, because the directly perceived personal experience of each person is strictly private to that person.
QBism incorporates into nature's fundamental laws nothing beyond an acknowledgment that those laws are stated in human language and rest upon human experience. This in no way puts the subjects of linguistics or psychology outside the realm of scientific inquiry. It may suggest that these subjects are harder to disentangle from the common understanding of the material world that physicists strive to construct, but whether or not aspects of them are intrinsically beyond the scope of physics to address is, as Peierls it. This is why the notion of classicality plays so big a role in orthodox interpretations. The "classical" (or the "macroscopic" or the "irreversible") is a catch basin. Its actual purpose is only to make physicists less uncomfortable, by hiding the subjective and the personal behind something taken to be objective and impersonal. 56 The many "paradoxes" of orthodox quantum mechanics -for example the lack of any physical mechanism underlying the collapse of a quantum state -are a sign that this stratagem does not work.
It once made sense to exclude the scientist from scientific explanations of the physical world. This warded off superstitious, animistic, or religious explanations. But without endorsing superstition, animism, or religion, today it makes sense to insist that the scientist should not be excluded from a philosophical understanding of the nature of scientific explanation. Why shouldn't such an understanding involve the explainer, as well as the explained? It is our exclusion of each individual subject from the story we tell about science that underlies our ninety year failure to agree upon the meaning of quantum mechanics.
This exclusion of the subject has sown confusion even in strictly classical physics.
When used in a setting well described by classical physics, QBism may be called CBism.
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Carnap's report 4.3.1 of Einstein's insistence that there was no room for the Now in physics is a spectacular example of a puzzle in classical physics resolved by CBism. When viewed from this perspective, Carnap's story illustrates the mindset that kept Einstein from accepting quantum mechanics. It is worth expanding on.
The experience of the Now does indeed mean something special for me, something essentially different from my past and my future. The apparent absence from physics of this important difference is an artifact of the unwarranted removal of the subject from the story physics is allowed to tell. That the Now appears to be unavoidably missing is a 56 Particularly the phrase "classical" can often be taken to be nothing more than an orthodox euphemism for "experience". Suppose we move apart and back together at such speeds that 3 minutes pass on my watch and 5 minutes on yours, and suppose we each update our diagrams at our first meeting and every minute after that, according to our own watch. Then as we meet again, I will be doing my third updating since we left each other and you will be doing your fifth. Even if our watches have changed by significantly different amounts between the two intersections of our trajectories that represent our two meetings, if our Nows coincide at our first meeting, they will also coincide at our second meeting.
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So, far from having nothing to say about the Now, physics actually describes it in a way that is consistent with our psychological and social experience of each other, even in a world of people moving about at relativistic speeds.
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But to apply physics to the Now to reach this conclusion, one must acknowledge that the subject -the particular user of physics -is as much a part of the story as the object If you insist on a physics that makes no reference whatever to the individual user of physics, then there is indeed no room in that physics for either the Here or the Now.
Making a mystery out of the obvious difference between the present moment and what is past or yet to be, seems an excessive price to pay for maintaining the centuries-old exclusion of the user from the story told by physics.
So it is not just our understanding of quantum mechanics that has been obscured by the exclusion of the user. To understand the prevailing confusion about quantum 61 This is true whether or not each of us chooses to represent all the relevant events in our own private diagram, or we agree to represent them all in a single common diagram.
62 A skeptical referee asked what it would be like if our Nows were not in synchronization. The only difference, if we somehow knew that they were not, is that each of us would know that they were interacting with a mindless automaton -the technical term here seems to be "zombie". The point of the argument above is only that if you adopt a CBist perspective then physics itself is fully capable of accounting for the naive human experience of the Now, contrary to Einstein's assertion. mechanics, it helps to understand that the historic exclusion of the user, while it may have helped get science off the ground, is today responsible not only for the confusion at the foundations of quantum mechanics, but also for a broader misunderstanding of the nature of science in general.
I first write about my understanding of QBism in Physics Today. 63 That brief essay elicited several critical letters to the editor. They all had one thing in common. Each writer had no problem understanding what quantum mechanics was all about. Each described their own understanding -they were all different -and, to my disappointment, had nothing whatever to say either for or against the point of view that I was advocating.
Since writing that essay I had come to realize that an earlier essay I had published in VI. A few final reflections.
Physics Today
The language of science scrupulously avoids mentioning the subject -the user of science. So does much of the ordinary language we have learned to use to talk about the external world. The puzzles and paradoxes of quantum mechanics arise from such omissions. Putting the scientist back into the story requires us to expand into human terms all concise speech possible. 67 Abstractions like quantum states, waves, particles, trajectories, spatial and temporal locations, energy levels, etc. are all common impersonal concepts that we have created to help us make sense of our own particular personal experiences.
For most purposes we can safely regard these abstractions as entities that are properties of a real objective world. Indeed, we must, if we are not to be swept away by a tidal wave of complex verbal expansions. In a similar way, it is simpler and more natural to regard space and time as conditions in which we live, rather than, more accurately, as modes in which we think.
QBism is needed to address metaphysical issues lying outside the bounds of practical physical inquiry. 68 For practical purposes it doesn't matter if, like most physicists, I confer objective reality on the theoretical abstractions that enable me to calculate the likelihood of my subsequent experience. But for resolving certain conceptual puzzles like "are quantum states real?", or "the measurement problem", or "why is the Now excluded from orthodox physics", it is essential not to reify what are fundamentally intellectual tools, and not to treat what is fundamentally subjective and personal as if it were objective and universal.
Why have we kept fooling ourselves about such metaphysical issues for so many years?
Speaking only for myself, I can trace it back to the sentiment that led me in 1956 to graduate school in physics, rather than to law school. The problem with the law, I felt, was that it was based on principles that grew out of human conditions -principles that referred to human judgments or perceptions. I wanted to devote my life to something more objective and impersonal, less contingent on human imperfection and imprecision. It can be hard to acknowledge that it's humanity all the way down, in all fields -even physical science. There was no need to acknowledge it until quantum mechanics refused to make sense 69 for almost a century.
In 2017 I was asked to contribute my thoughts on these and related issues to an annual series of essay collections published only in Czech by the Václav and Dagmar Havel foundation. 70 Karl Pribram had begun the series in 1999 with Mozek a mysl -"brain and mind". Umberto Eco followed him with Mysl a smysl -"mind and meaning". And 67 Cf. John Bell's remark 4.1.2 about the term "Professor Peierls." 68 Not all QBists agree with this. The hope has been expressed that by reformulating quantum mechanics explicitly in terms of probabilistic expectation in the QBist sense, one might achieve not only a deeper understanding of the theory, but even some clues about its refinement or generalization.
69 Unless, like Einstein, you too were troubled by the problem of the Now. 70 N. David Mermin, Mysl, Smysl, Svȇt, Mavlovaný Kraj, Praha, 2017.
Zdenȇk Neubauer picked up the baton and contributed Smysl a svȇt -"meaning and world". In the fifteen titles that followed those first three, the pattern was abandoned.
But Pribram, Eco, and Neubauer gave me my title for volume nineteen: Mysl, smysl, svȇt.
Science starts with mind , the private library of experience for each of us. From the contents of our own experience each of us strives to assemble what that experience means about the world that gives rise to it. An all too common misreading of QBism in the popular scientific press is "It's all mind". This is as wrong as the opinion most physicists have about physics, that it's all world. There is mind and there is a world. Quantum mechanics has taught us that we cannot understand what we are talking about without paying attention to both. What links the contents of my mind to the world that induces them is the meaning I construct for my experience.
If I had to design a coat of arms for QBism, it would display three words: mysl, smysl, svȇt. They would have to be in Czech. "Mind, meaning, world" has no poetry in it. And what physicists' understanding of quantum mechanics has lacked for ninety years is any hint of poetry.
Paul Dirac is said to have told Robert Oppenheimer that science takes something nobody can understand and says it in a way that anybody can understand, whereas poetry takes something everybody can understand and says it in a way that nobody can understand. In 2017 QBism takes the scientific process, which almost all scientists think they understand, and states it in a way that only half a dozen currently understand. It's my hope that this essay may induce a few more people to think about joining us. 
